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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Supreme Court of the United States’ recent decision in ABC, 
Inc. v. Aereo, Inc.1 reflects a growing imbalance between the market power 
of broadcasters and the government-owned distribution technology they 
control to distribute their content.2  Broadcast networks and affiliates, in 
legal filings and public comments, have drawn a line in the sand when it 
comes to technologies such as Aereo’s, which allow viewers to bypass local 
cable systems to receive antenna signals:  Had the Supreme Court sided with 
Aereo, incumbent broadcasters threatened publicly to migrate their signals to 
other Multichannel Video Programming Distributors (“MVPDs”), such as 
cable or internet service providers.3  Since nearly eighty-three percent of 
Americans receive their digital broadcast signals via cable and satellite 
MVPDs, broadcasters have grown to rely on retransmission consent fees 
* Professor of Law and Director of the Amicus Project, Southwestern Law
School.  Supervising Editor of the Journal of International Media and Entertainment Law, 
published by the American Bar Association and the Donald E. Biederman Entertainment and 
Media Law Institute at Southwestern.  The author thanks Natasha Mehlum, a Biederman 
Scholar at Southwestern, for her assistance in the preparation of this Article. 
1. No. 13-461, slip op. (U.S. June 25, 2014).
2. See id. at 8, 12–13, 17–18.
3. See 47 U.S.C. § 522(13) (2012); Aereo, Inc., No. 13-461, slip. op. at 8,
12–13, 17–18; Greg Sandoval, A Bet That Diller-Backed Aereo TV Startup Wins Its Day in 
Court, CNET (June 3, 2012, 4:00 AM), http://www.cnet.com/news/a-bet-that-diller-backed-
aereo-tv-startup-wins-its-day-in-court/. 
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from these MVPDs as a primary source of revenue, in addition to 
advertising.4 
Broadcasters’ reliance on retransmission fees, however, undermine 
the free, over-the-air model of broadcast distribution enshrined in the 
Communications Act of 1934, and enforced by the Federal Communications 
Commission (“FCC”) through regulation.5  Those fortunate enough to be 
granted a broadcast license benefit from what is known as a command-and-
control spectrum use policy that gives the licensee exclusive control of a 
large amount of frequency bandwidth—government bandwidth that is scarce, 
valuable, and in high demand by other telecommunications providers.6  This 
Article will examine the law and policy issues relating to a significant 
reduction—but not an abandonment—of the command-and-control system of 
spectrum use by current licensees.7  Simply put, broadcasters would use less 
spectrum to receive the same core benefits they have now.8  Indeed, 
Congress and the FCC should encourage a spectrum allocation system that 
allows for more efficient and localized use of frequency bandwidth by more 
users, while preserving public interest set-asides for current network and 
affiliate content on non-broadcast MVPDs. 
II. REVISITING THE FCC’S SPECTRUM REALLOCATION DEBATE 
In 2002, FCC Chairman Michael Powell convened a Spectrum Task 
Force that issued a report analyzing FCC policy regarding spectrum use.9  
The mandate of the task force was not only to review the current approaches 
to spectrum management, but also to explore alternative models of spectrum 
management that would “better promote the most efficient and productive 
use of [the] spectrum.”10 
In its report, the Spectrum Task Force describes three models of 
spectrum use in the United States:  command-and-control, exclusive use, and 
                                                 
4. See Only Seven Percent of TV Households Rely on Over-the-Air Signals, 
According to CEA Study, CONSUMER ELECTRONICS ASS’N (July 30, 2013), http://www.ce.org/
News/News-Releases/Press-Releases/2013-Press-Releases/Only-Seven-Percent-of-TV-
Households-Rely-on-Over-t.aspx; Sandoval, supra note 3. 
5. See Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. §§ 151–154 (2012); 
Sandoval, supra note 3. 
6. FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N SPECTRUM POLICY TASK FORCE, REPORT OF THE 
SPECTRUM RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES WORKING GROUP 2–3, 10–11 (2002). 
7. See infra Part II, III. 
8. See FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N SPECTRUM POLICY TASK FORCE, supra note 
6, at 2–3, 17–18. 
9. See id. at 1. 
10. Id. 
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open access.11  Command-and-control is the most regulatory intensive of the 
models.12  “The traditional process of spectrum management in the United 
States,” command-and-control, requires the FCC to “allocate[] and assign[] 
frequencies to limited categories of spectrum users for specific government-
defined uses,”  including broadcasting.13  Nearly every aspect of spectrum 
use is defined by the FCC, including:  user eligibility requirements, “service 
restrictions, power limits, build-out requirements”, and infrastructure 
specifications, among others.14 
One of the great innovations of the Spectrum Task Force Report is 
its nod to exclusive use and open access use alternatives, both of which are 
more efficient than traditional command-and-control.15  The 2002 Spectrum 
Task Force Report describes exclusive use as 
 
[a] licensing model in which a licensee has exclusive and 
transferable rights to the use of [a] specified spectrum within a 
defined geographic area, with flexible use rights that are governed 
primarily by technical rules to protect spectrum users against 
interference.  Under this model, exclusive rights resemble property 
rights in spectrum, but this model does not imply or require 
creation of full private property rights in spectrum.16 
 
Many envision a system where broadcast signals could be relayed 
like mobile telephony across licensed signal conduits.17  In such a system, 
programmers can distribute content without monopolizing a dedicated 
frequency in an entire market.18  In effect, this is what many consumers do 
when they live stream a retransmitted feed from a broadcast television or 
radio station over a 4G or LTE connection to their smartphone or tablet.19  
From the consumer’s standpoint, there is no discernible difference in the 
                                                 
11. Id. at 2. 
12. See id. at 3–5. 
13. FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N SPECTRUM POLICY TASK FORCE, supra note 6, at 
2. 
14. Id. 
15. Id. at 17, 19. 
16. Id. at 2. 
17. See Only Seven Percent of TV Households Rely on Over-the-Air Signals, 
According to CEA Study, supra note 4. 
18. See WILLIAM LEHR, MASS. INST. OF TECH., TOWARD MORE EFFICIENT 
SPECTRUM MANAGEMENT: NEW MODELS FOR PROTECTED SHARED ACCESS 4–5 (2014), 
available at http://cfp.mit.edu/publications/CFP_Papers/CFP%20Spectrum%20Sharing%
20Paper%202014.pdf. 
19. See Walter S. Mossberg, 4G or Not 4G:  A Guide to Cut Through All the 
‘Fast’ Talk, WALL ST. J., Mar. 28, 2012, at D1; Only Seven Percent of TV Households Rely on 
Over-the-Air Signals, According to CFA Study, supra note 4. 
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reception experience.20  But from a spectrum use standpoint, using a 
frequency for program streaming is much more efficient.21  For one, it is 
interactive, allowing consumers to choose what programs to stream over it.22  
But more importantly, the frequency itself is used more efficiently.23 
The least restrictive of the models is open access, also widely 
referred to as the commons.24  The commons is kind of like the wild west of 
spectrum use.25  As the report describes, the commons model 
 
[a]llows unlimited numbers of unlicensed users to share 
frequencies, with usage rights that are governed by technical 
standards or etiquettes but with no right to protection from 
interference.  Spectrum is available to all users that comply with 
established technical etiquettes or standards that set power limits 
and other criteria for operation of unlicensed devices to mitigate 
potential interference.”26 
 
By the turn of the current century, a number of academics, including 
Lawrence Lessig, pushed the commons model as a means to make spectrum 
use more efficient.27  In his book, The Future of Ideas, Lessig lauds the 
commons as a way to free spectrum from the yoke of government control:28 
My claim is that there is enough evidence of a different way to 
order spectrum that we should be exploring whether spectrum 
could be ordered as a commons. 
. . . There would be a role for regulation even if spectrum were 
free.  But this regulation would look very different from the 
regulation that now controls spectrum.  The government—or the 
market—would not be deciding who gets to use the spectrum.  The 
government would simply be assuring that the technologies that 
use the spectrum are properly certified technologies. 
                                                 
20. See Only Seven Percent of TV Households Rely on Over-the-Air Signals, 
According to CFA Study, supra note 4. 
21. See FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N SPECTRUM POLICY TASK FORCE, supra note 
6, at 6. 
22. See id. 
23. See id. 
24. Id. at 2. 
25. See id. 
26. FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N SPECTRUM POLICY TASK FORCE, supra note 6, at 
2. 
27. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE 
COMMONS IN A CONNECTED WORLD 92 (2001). 
28. Id. at 83–84. 
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. . . The role of the government . . . would be much less invasive 
than under the current regulatory regime.29 
 
Despite its embrace of the alternative spectrum management models 
for certain uses, the Spectrum Task Force ultimately concludes that certain 
uses of spectrum should continue to be managed under traditional command-
and-control.30  Command-and-control, in their view, is important to promote 
and enforce public interest objectives:31 
 
With respect to the command-and-control model, . . . the 
[Task Force] recognizes that continued use of this approach may 
be required in situations where prescribing spectrum use by 
regulation is necessary to accomplish compelling public interest 
objectives.  However, such objectives should be carefully defined, 
and the amount of spectrum subject to a command-and-control 
should be limited to . . . [that which] ensure[s] that those objectives 
are achieved.  Many spectrum users will claim that they warrant 
special consideration and thus deserve exemption from any reform 
of their service allocation rules.  It is therefore critical to 
distinguish between special interest and the public interest, 
establishing a high bar for any service to clear prior to receiving an 
exemption.32 
 
The Spectrum Task Force Report concluded in 2002 that command-
and-control was, as of then, the best model for broadcasting.33  But they left 
open the possibility that the time may come when efficiency considerations 
would outweigh public interest mandates.34  “For the time being, broadcast 
spectrum should continue to be subject to the command-and-control model 
due to the public interest obligations placed on broadcasters and the free 
over-the-air nature of broadcast service.”35  In the future, the balance 
between efficiency and public interest would need to be reevaluated.36 
 
We further recommend that the Commission fundamentally alter 
the existing balance among these models—which is dominated by 
                                                 
29. Id. at 83. 
30. FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N SPECTRUM POLICY TASK FORCE, supra note 6, at 
20. 
31. Id. at 20. 
32. Id. at 20–21. 
33. See id. at 44. 
34. See id. 
35. FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N SPECTRUM POLICY TASK FORCE, supra note 6, at 
44. 
36. Id. 
5
M.: Reclaiming The Promise Of Free Local Broadcasting: Spectrum Reall
Published by NSUWorks, 2017
330 NOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39 
legacy command-and-control regulation—by expanding the use of 
both the exclusive use and commons models throughout the radio 
spectrum, and limiting the use of the command-and-control model 
to those instances where there are compelling public policy reasons 
to continue using it.37 
 
In the nearly fifteen years since the Spectrum Task Force published 
its report, the need for greater spectrum use efficiency has increased 
significantly with the explosion of broadband and mobile telephony.38  At the 
same time, the utility of spectrum-based command-and-control broadcasting 
has diminished significantly.39  Broadcasters thrive in an age when the vast 
majority of American households rely on signal retransmission to receive 
broadcast programming through cable or satellite service, or by simply 
streaming on demand over a broadband Internet connection.40  Is the current 
6 MHz command-and-control allocation really in the public’s interest?  Or is 
it tantamount to an overly generous give-away of a government benefit to 
meet an industry’s special interest?  This Article proposes that the time has 
come to revisit the balance between efficiency and public interest in the use 
of broadcast spectrum.41 
III. REFRAMING THE PUBLIC INTEREST DEBATE 
Broadcasters benefit from two government-granted legal 
monopolies.42  They enjoy a license—without a government fee—that 
entitles them to command and control 6 MHz of radio spectrum in a 
specified local market for their private benefit.43  In addition, Congress 
created a market for these licenses, worth fifty billion dollars in the 
aggregate, by allowing broadcast entities to transfer licenses to third parties 
at market rates—and without recoupment of any of that value to the 
                                                 
37. Id. at 16–17. 
38. See Only Seven Percent of TV Households Rely on Over-the-Air Signals, 
According to CEA Study, supra note 4. 
39. See FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N SPECTRUM POLICY TASK FORCE, supra note 
6, at 42. 
40. See Only Seven Percent of TV Households Rely on Over-the-Air Signals, 
According to CEA Study, supra note 4. 
41. See infra Part IV. 
42. See 47 U.S.C. § 307(c)(1) (2012); Jeffrey A. Eisenach, The Equities and 
Economics of Property Interests in TV Spectrum Licenses, NAVIGANT ECON. 6–7 (Jan. 2014), 
http://www.nab.org/documents/newsRoom/pdfs/011614_Navigant_spectrum_study.pdf. 
43. 47 U.S.C. § 307(a), (c)(1); see also FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, THE 
BROADCAST TELEVISION SPECTRUM INCENTIVE AUCTION: INNOVATION IN POLICY TO IGNITE 
INNOVATION FOR CONSUMERS AND BUSINESS, FCC STAFF SUMMARY 3 (2013), available at 
https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-318455A1.pdf. 
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government.44  Broadcasters also keep their licenses in perpetuity, with 
largely pro forma renewals every eight years.45  In addition, broadcast 
licensees’ stations are universally available to the public, either through 
channels mandated for antenna reception on American television sets or, at 
the licensee’s election, through compulsory free carriage on pay television 
systems in their local area.46  In return for this command-and-control benefit, 
licensees are subject to regulations in the public interest, including public 
interest requirements for broadcasters, including candidate access, children’s 
television programming, indecency, and even no-longer-operable initiatives 
like ascertainment and the Fairness Doctrine.47 
Broadcasters also benefit from a second government monopoly, a 
bundle of exclusive rights set forth in the Copyright Act of 1976.48  The 
principal benefit available to licensees under copyright law is the ability to 
negotiate—and renegotiate—retransmission consent of its programming with 
other pay television MVPDs, like cable and satellite providers.49  These 
negotiated retransmission fees stand as a revenue-generating alternative to 
the must-carry rules available under the Cable Television Consumer 
Protection and Competition Act of 1992 (“Cable Television Act”), which 
mandates compulsory carriage of a broadcaster’s signal without a licensing 
fee if the broadcaster so elects.50  Until the 1970s, pay television 
retransmission consent and negotiated royalty payments were not issues for 
broadcast licensees who relied on cable television systems to relay their 
signals into communities where topography or interference prevented 
spectrum reception.51  These Community Antenna Television systems, as 
they were known during this era, were allowed to retransmit the licensees’ 
signals for free so that broadcasters could more fully realize the benefit of 
their command-and-control spectrum allocation.52  Broadcasters essentially 
                                                 
44. Eisenach, supra note 42, at 6, 11. 
45. 47 U.S.C. § 307(c)(1). 
46. See 47 U.S.C. § 534 (2012). 
47. See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 377–78 (1969). 
48. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012). 
49. Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. 
L. No. 102-385, § 6(2)(b)(1)(A)–(D), 106 Stat. 1460, 1482.  Broadcasters also enjoy limited 
rights as exclusive licensees of other copyright holders that create television programming.  17 
U.S.C. § 106(4)–(5). 
50. See § 4(a), 106 Stat. at 1471; § 6(2)(b)(1)(A)–(D), 106 Stat. at 1482. 
51. STUART MINOR BENJAMIN ET AL., TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW AND POLICY 
385–90 (1st ed. 2001). 
52. Id. at 380. 
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did without one government benefit to avail themselves more effectively of 
the other.53 
By the time of the 1976 Copyright Act, however, the media 
landscape had already changed.54  In the 1960s, cable television providers 
discovered that customers were willing to pay for original content.55  
Dedicated basic cable channels and premium services proliferated, and pay 
television became a programming alternative to broadcasting.56  Cable was 
no longer Community Antenna Television; it had become a competing 
programming source, and a nascent threat to the established hegemony of 
broadcasting.57  This threat was addressed in the Copyright Act, in the very 
provisions that were before the United States Supreme Court in the Aereo 
case in 2014.58  Indeed, the public performance language that expressly 
applies copyright protection to the unaltered retransmission of a 
broadcaster’s signal legislatively overruled two Supreme Court cases from 
the CATV era, Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc.59 and 
Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.,60 which had 
viewed unaltered retransmissions as an exception to the retransmission 
consent requirement under the Copyright Act.61 
In the four decades since the Copyright Act, broadcast licensees’ 
reliance on the benefits of retransmission consent has increased significantly, 
as pay television became the dominant pipeline into American homes for 
television programming.62  Now television broadcasters, and the networks 
that own many of the stations, regularly engage in negotiations with cable 
television providers in hope of exacting a high market rate fee for 
retransmission consent.63  While they take a risk of having the negotiations 
fail, and getting blacked out on a local system, the upside has been great for 
broadcasters.64  A number of recent instances underscore the importance of 
                                                 
53. See FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N SPECTRUM POLICY TASK FORCE, supra note 
6, at 3–4. 
54. See Sharon Strover, Cable Television:  United States, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
TELEVISION 2004, (Museum of Broad Commc’ns, Vol. 1, 2004). 
55. See id. 
56. See id. 
57. See id. 
58. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 106 (2012); see ABC, Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., No. 13-461, 
slip op. at 7–8 (U.S. June 25, 2014). 
59. 392 U.S. 390 (1968). 
60. 415 U.S. 394 (1974). 
61. 17 U.S.C. § 101; Aereo, Inc., No. 13-461, slip op. at 7; see also 
Teleprompter Corp., 415 U.S. at 414–15; Fortnightly Corp., 392 U.S. at 400–01. 
62. See Strover, supra note 54. 
63. FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, supra note 43, at 1. 
64. See id. 
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this new revenue source to broadcasters.65  In the 1990s, then Disney chair 
Michael Eisner may have threatened to pull Monday Night Football from its 
ABC network lineup because he was frustrated over affiliate compensation, 
which he considered uneconomic.66  The move of Monday Night Football to 
ESPN, became a reality under Bob Iger’s tenure, in 2006.67  A more dramatic 
dust-up was created by Chase Carey, COO of News Corporation, in 2013 
when he publicly mused about moving the entire Fox Broadcasting Network 
to cable.68  The threat was made in response to the perceived threat of Aereo 
to upend the retransmission consent fees that Fox had begun to rely upon.69  
One is left to wonder if Fox and other networks would have really abandoned 
their command-and-control spectrum if Aereo had prevailed in 2014.70 
The problem for broadcasters is that these two monopolies are 
fundamentally incompatible.71  The more licensees rely on the Copyright Act 
for revenue, the less valuable the benefit of command-and-control spectrum 
is for them.72  It is an inverse proportion that has been borne out by the failed 
promise of digital signal propagation.73 
In 2009, the FCC completed a gradual transition from the National 
Television System Committee (“NTSC”) standard definition television—the 
system that had been in place since 1940—to advanced television signals, a 
digital system that was supposed to usher in an era of crystal-clear reception 
and high-resolution.74  Unlike its analog counterpart, signals encoded 
                                                 
65. See, e.g., David S. Cohen, News Corp. Threatens to Make Fox Cable-Only 
Amid Aereo Dispute, VARIETY (Apr. 8, 2013, 10:42 AM), http://variety.com/2013/
digital/news/chase-carey-threatens-to-yank-fox-from-broadcast-tv-over-aereo-1200334235/. 
66. See Marc Gunther & Carol Vinzant, Eisner’s Mousetrap Disney’s CEO 
Says the Company Has a Lot of Varied Problems He Can Fix.  But What If the Real Issue Is 
Something He Can’t Face?, FORTUNE (Sept. 6, 1999), http://archive.fortune.com/magazines/
fortune/fortune_archive/1999/09/06/265291/index.htm. 
67. See Bob Raissman & Matt Marrone, ESPN Grabs “Monday Night 
Football”, AM. SPORTSCASTERS ONLINE, http://www.americansportscastersonline.com/
mondaynightfootball.html (last visited Aug. 10, 2015); Robert A. Iger: Chairman and Chief 
Executive Officer, WALT DISNEY COMPANY, https://thewaltdisneycompany.com/about-
disney/leadership/ceo/robert-iger (last visited Aug. 10, 2015). 
68. Cohen, supra note 65. 
69. See id. 
70. See ABC, Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., No. 13-461, slip op. at 17–18 (U.S. June 25, 
2014); Cohen, supra note 65. 
71. Compare 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012), with FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, supra 
note 43, at 1, 5. 
72. See 17 U.S.C. § 106; KIMBERLY M. RANDOLPH, STOUT RISIUS ROSS 
SPECTRUM LICENSES:  VALUATION INTRICACIES 2 (2011), 
http://www.srr.com/assets/pdf/spectrum-licenses-valuation-intricacies.pdf. 
73. See FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, supra note 43, at 5. 
74. James Miller & James E. Preiger, The Broadcasters’ Transition Date 
Roulette:  Strategic Aspects of the DTV Transition, 9 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 437, 444 
9
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digitally cannot be partially decoded.75  Referred to as the digital cliff effect, 
all of a signal must be received or nothing can be decoded.76  The digital cliff 
proved to be an obstacle for antenna television households in major cities 
and rural areas.77  Reception in metropolitan areas with skyscrapers or 
mountains has been spotty since the transition, with large swaths of major 
cities like Los Angeles and New York from what the FCC calls the cliff 
effect, making antenna service impossible or too expensive.78  Households in 
rural areas similarly discovered that digital signals could not reach them.79  
Digital signals, as it turns out, have a higher drop-off rate as they travel 
longer distances than analog signals, making them unsuitable for homes far 
from city transmission towers.80 
For some, it may be possible to buy an expensive roof-mounted 
antenna that can scan interactively for signals, but the added expense and 
technical challenges have not proven worth it for most.81  For apartment 
dwellers without access to a rooftop antenna, no amount of money will make 
signal reception possible.82  Moreover, unless one subscribed to a pay 
television MVPD, homes were required to replace their old equipment with a 
new digital television, or a set-top converter box, and a new antenna.83  To 
alleviate the cost burden to consumers during the transition, the U.S. 
government initiated a coupon program for low-cost or no-cost converter 
boxes.84  Pay television subscribers did not have to buy new equipment; they 
                                                                                                       
(2011); Digital Television, FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, http://www.fcc.gov/digital-television 
(last visited Aug. 10, 2015); see also Roy Furchgott, A Downside to Digital TV, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 24, 2008, at C6. 
75. See Miller & Preiger, supra note 74, at 448. 
76. Id. 
77. Id.; see also Furchgott, supra note 74. 
78. FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, FCC 05-199, STUDY OF DIGITAL TELEVISION 
FIELD STRENGTH STANDARDS AND TESTING PROCEDURES 25 (2005); see also Furchgott, supra 
note 74 (noting digital reception is more easily blocked than analog reception). 
79. See Furchgott, supra note 74. 
80. See Miller & Preiger, supra note 74, at 448; Furchgott, supra note 74; The 
Digital TV Transition:  Reception Maps, FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, 
http://transition.fcc.gov/mb/engineering/dtvmaps/ (last visited Aug. 10, 2015). 
81. See Furchgott, supra note 74; The Digital TV Transition:  Reception 
Maps, supra note 80. 
82. See JONATHAN RINTELS ET AL., LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE ON CIVIL RIGHTS 
& LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE ON CIVIL RIGHTS EDUC. FUND, TRANSITION IN TROUBLE:  ACTION 
NEEDED TO ENSURE A SUCCESSFUL DIGITAL TELEVISION TRANSITION 27–28 (2008) (“These 
digital gaps are not confined to sparsely populated rural areas; rather . . . millions of viewers 
in New York, Los Angeles, Boston, and other major metro areas will experience digital gaps 
in coverage.”). 
83. See id. at 7; Digital Television, supra note 74. 
84. Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-171, § 3005(a)–(b), 120 
Stat. 4, 23 (2005). 
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could continue to use their existing NTSC televisions, did not need an 
antenna, and could continue to get a high-quality signal retransmission of 
broadcast and transmission of non-broadcast channels.85  In theory, pay 
television subscribers would be foregoing high-definition reception, but since 
many licensees had opted to multiplex their generous command-and-control 
bandwidth into standard definition programming streams, pay MVPD 
subscribers with standard definition receivers were not really giving up 
much.86 
Despite its promise of a new era for broadcasting, the government’s 
transition from analog to digital television was a boon for the pay television 
industry.87  Households that had once relied on free, over-the-air antenna 
television could no longer economically receive a decodable signal in the 
digital age.88  Instead of making broadcasters more competitive with pay 
television, the move to digital television made broadcasters more reliant 
upon it.89 
IV. TOWARD A MORE BALANCED SPECTRUM ALLOCATION POLICY 
A. Preserving Command-and-Control on a Smaller Scale 
Efficient spectrum reallocation does not need to abandon command-
and-control spectrum use, despite its inherent inefficiency.90  As the 2002 
Spectrum Task Force Report points out, command-and-control assures a 
variety of spectrum use in the public interest, including satellite access, 
emergency services, and, of course, terrestrial broadcasting.91  This Article, 
however, proposes a middle ground that is tilted much farther away from the 
current command-and-control structure.92  The idea here is to reduce the 
spectrum allocation to a bare minimum, enough so that licensees can 
transmit by relay to digital receivers to the cord-cutters and cord-nevers, 
perhaps using a technology not unlike that employed unsuccessfully by 
                                                 
85. See RINTELS ET AL., supra note 82, at 28; Only Seven Percent of TV 
Households Rely on Over-the-Air Signals, According to CEA Study, supra note 4. 
86. Albert N. Lung, Note, Must-Carry Rules in the Transition to Digital 
Television:  A Delicate Constitutional Balance, 22 CARDOZO L. REV. 151, 206 (2000). 
87. See Digital Television, supra note 74; Only Seven Percent of TV 
Households Rely on Over-the-Air Signals, According to CEA Study, supra note 4. 
88. RINTELS ET AL., supra note 82, at 7. 
89. Id. 
90. See FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N SPECTRUM POLICY TASK FORCE, supra note 
6, at 4, 44. 
91. Id. at 20–21. 
92. See infra Part IV.A. 
11
M.: Reclaiming The Promise Of Free Local Broadcasting: Spectrum Reall
Published by NSUWorks, 2017
336 NOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39 
Aereo.93  How much spectrum is needed may be an open question, but this 
would be a significant reduction in the bandwidth currently provided by 
government.94  Signal power may also be an issue.95  If broadcasting is 
integrated into the existing infrastructure of cell towers and hot spots, it may 
be that the stations can operate at low power with little or no interference.96  
The quality of revamped antenna television reception may be a concern for 
licensees and broadcast networks, however.97  Broadcasters do not want it to 
be too good; otherwise, they would not be able to command high 
retransmission consent fees from pay television MVPDs.98  One way to 
address this may be to allow broadcasters to enhance the signal to the 
MVPD, allowing for a richer, or possibly even high-definition primary video 
and audio signal for the cable or satellite provider’s paying customers.99  
This would likely require action by Congress, but it would give broadcasters 
and pay television what they want most.100  A premium tier broadcast service 
would look and sound better than what would be available via antenna.101 
To be clear, this is a policy that the FCC has been tentatively testing 
with its voluntary spectrum buy-back plan for broadcasters, as set forth in the 
Agency’s 2010 Spectrum Task Force Report.102  So far, the buy-back has not 
freed up a lot spectrum, which the FCC acknowledges it needs to expand 
broadband and mobile telephony to underserved communities.103  
Broadcasters do not want to give up the scarce resource of spectrum, which 
                                                 
93. ABC, Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., No. 13-461, slip op. at 14–15, 17 (U.S. June 25, 
2014). 
94. See FED COMMC’NS COMM’N SPECTRUM POLICY TASK FORCE, supra note 
6, at 26, 30. 
95. See id. at 46. 
96. See id. at 14. 
97. See Michael M. Epstein, “Primary Video” and Its Secondary Effects on 
Digital Broadcasting:  Cable Carriage of Multiplexed Signals Under the 1992 Cable Act and 
the First Amendment, 87 MARQ. L. REV. 525, 543 (2004). 
98. See id. at 542–43; Sandoval, supra note 3. 
99. See Epstein, supra note 97, at 529, 543.  More revolutionary transmission 
technologies like Visible Light Communications—also known as Li-Fi—could be utilized 
similarly in the service of broadcasters.  See Joao MM Santos et al., Hybrid GaN LED with 
Capillary-Bonded II–VI MQW Color-Converting Membrane for Visible Light 
Communications, SEMICONDUCTOR SCI. & TECH., March 2015, at 1, 
http://iopscience.iop.org/0268-1242/30/3/035012/pdf/0268-1242_30_3_035012.pdf. 
100. See Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 301 (2012). 
101. See Digital Television, supra note 74. 
102. Cecilia Kang, FCC to Offer Plan for TV Airwaves Auction, WASH. POST, 
Sept. 7, 2012, at A26; see also FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, MOBILE BROADBAND: THE BENEFITS 
OF ADDITIONAL SPECTRUM 4 (2010). 
103. FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, supra note 102, at 4–5; see also Amy Gahran, 
FCC Warns of Looming Mobile Spectrum Crunch, CNN (Nov. 5, 2010, 5:14 PM), 
http://www.cnn.com/2010/TECH/mobile/11/05/gahran.mobile.spectrum.crunch/. 
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because of third-party resale has great value.104  But, in the Spectrum 
Reduction Plan proposed here, the return of spectrum—and bandwidth—
would be mandatory regulation.105  By making it mandatory, the FCC can 
help broadcasters understand what they apparently are unable to see:  A 
generous spectrum bandwidth allocation is not significant to the principal 
benefit they receive as terrestrial broadcasters.106  In that sense, this proposal 
takes existing FCC spectrum policy to the next level.107 
To make this work, the FCC would need to reallocate de minimus 
bandwidth to primary audio and video signal, as defined under the Cable 
Television Act.108  Weak broadcasters—the ones that Turner Broadcasting 
System, Inc. v. FCC109 recognized was in Congress’ purview to help 
economically with the must-carry rules—could still take advantage of cable 
distribution without payment—essentially the status quo benefit of 
broadcasting without the inefficient use of a government resource.110  Strong 
stations have demonstrated that they do not need this benefit of spectrum 
monopoly, but they would still be able to use the de minimus spectrum.111  
And they could still choose compulsory free carriage under current law.112 
Put differently, a broadcaster gets almost all the benefits of 
command and control—and the monopoly market power that comes with 
it—by reducing spectrum bandwidth subject to monopoly license to a much 
lower minimum.113  It is more responsive to a market reality in which 
broadcasters have effectively abandoned their government monopoly in 
exchange for free, over-the-air television.114  Ultimately, the real benefits of 
spectrum for broadcasters are the bundle of intellectual property rights that 
they have been able to monetize.115  Apart from licensing rights, the principal 
benefit of the federal regulatory system today is the capability of 
broadcasters to choose universal service, which most broadcasters do not 
choose to avail themselves of.116 
                                                 
104. See FED. COMMC’NS COMM’M, supra note 102, at 26 n.36. 
105. See infra Part IV. 
106. See FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N SPECTRUM POLICY TASK FORCE, supra note 
6, at 47–48. 
107. See id. at 2. 
108. See 47 U.S.C. § 535(g)(1) (2012). 
109. 520 U.S. 180 (1997). 
110. See id. at 213; 47 U.S.C. § 534(10) (2012). 
111. See TBS, 520 U.S. at 189. 
112. See 47 U.S.C. § 534(10). 
113. FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, supra note 43, at 1. 
114. See FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N SPECTRUM POLICY TASK FORCE, supra note 
6, at 42. 
115. See Eisenach, supra note 42, at 4, 17. 
116. See 47 U.S.C. § 534(10); Lung, supra note 86, at 159, 185. 
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B. Legislative and Broadcast Industry Opposition 
Incumbent licensees might try to argue that a reduction in spectrum 
allocation amounts to a taking of their property by the government.117  The 
Communications Act of 1934, however, expressly disclaims any property 
interest in their licenses.118  They may also argue that they have invested 
heavily in the infrastructure and technology of broadcasting.119  Moreover, 
this is not about revoking licenses, although Congress theoretically can do 
this without cause.120  Indeed, even if broadcasters can argue that they have 
some kind of property right to a government benefit, the critical aspects of 
that benefit would not be lost in a Spectrum Reduction Plan.121  First 
Amendment challenges would likely fail.122  Even if Red Lion Broadcasting 
Co. v. Federal Communications Commission’s123 vision of the public’s 
paramount interest does not survive a challenge, it is easy to characterize 
spectrum reduction as content neutral, allowing for a good deal of deference 
to Congress.124  There is also no reason to think that the FCC would run afoul 
of Chevron deference to its agency discretion. 
One might fully expect broadcasters and their lobbyists to express 
opposition to spectrum reduction.125  For one, when there is a proposed 
reduction in a government benefit, the recipients of that benefit will oppose 
it.126  But the critical question should be whether the public interest is being 
disserved by spectrum bandwidth reduction.  Indeed, the spectrum-reduced 
regime permits licensees to enjoy retransmission consent rights under the 
Copyright Act or compulsory carriage under Cable Television Act.127 
Without generous bandwidth, broadcasters would lose the ability to 
broadcast to antenna televisions in high definition.128  While the public has 
an interest in high definition broadcasting, the reality is that broadcasters 
split their bandwidth into lower definition programming streams instead of 
using their full bandwidth for high-resolution programming.129  This signal 
                                                 
117. See U.S. CONST. amend. V.; Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 
438 U.S. 104, 130 (1978). 
118. Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 301 (2012). 
119. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 110, 121–22. 
120. See Red Lion Broad Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 388–89 (1969). 
121. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 121. 
122. See id. at 133–34; Red Lion Broad Co., 395 U.S. at 389. 
123. 395 U.S. 367 (1969). 
124. See id. at 390, 399–400; Lung, supra note 86, at 172. 
125. See Red Lion Broad Co., 395 U.S. at 388–89. 
126. See id. at 388–89, 400. 
127. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012); Cable Television Consumer Protection Act of 
1992, Pub. L. No. 102-385, § 4 106 Stat. 1460, 1471 (1992). 
128. See Lung, supra note 86, at 206. 
129. See id. 
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multiplexing has become a significant source of additional revenue for 
broadcasters, but it was not part of the public interest benefit that Congress 
legislated when it mandated a transition to HDTV.130  Indeed, it runs counter 
to this benefit.131  In addition, whether a broadcaster transmits in HDTV is 
immaterial to cable and satellite customers whose box or televisions are not 
HDTV capable.132  Pay television subscribers, as discussed previously, could 
benefit from an enhance signal from broadcasters, as long as their tuner and 
television are HD capable.133 
Pay television MVPDs might mount a challenge to new regulations 
requiring set-asides for broadcast stations on their systems.134  There would 
be little possibility of success in the courts, however, as the issue was settled 
by the Supreme Court of the United States in Turner.135  Indeed, the 
implementation of a Spectrum Reduction Plan need not require a revamping 
of the must-carry rules currently in place.136  The change would be in the 
amount of spectrum that would be subject to the must-carry rules, the 
“primary audio and video signal.”137  From a cable or satellite provider’s 
standpoint, the burden is no different than it was before—it may even be less 
since unenhanced bandwidth would take up less of the subscriber’s 
broadband pipeline into the home.  Retransmission of an enhanced signal 
would be subject to negotiation and agreement with a broadcaster; a pay 
MVPD’s use of a licensee’s HDTV signal, for example, would be 
determined by the market, not by government regulation.138 
IV. CONCLUSION 
This Article does not propose a specific action plan; the idea here is 
to introduce a balance that preserves the principal rights and benefits of 
broadcasters in a way that makes much more efficient use of spectrum.  
Spectrum is much more valuable to the public interest if it is used for mobile 
                                                 
130. See Epstein, supra note 97, at 557, 568. 
131. See id. 
132. See FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N SPECTRUM POLICY TASK FORCE, supra note 
6, at 43.  
133. See supra notes 83, 85 and accompanying text. 
134. See supra Part III. 
135. TBS v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 189–90 (1997). 
136. See id. at 185, 189–90; Epstein, supra note 97, at 536–37. 
137. See Epstein, supra note 97, at 536–37. 
138. 47 U.S.C. §§ 325(b)(1)(A), 535(g)(1) (2012); see also Eisenach, supra 
note 42, at 8, 10–11. 
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telephony and new wireless broadband technologies.139  Even with a de 
minimus spectrum allocation, licensees still get a great deal from the 
government.140  They can continue to enjoy universal service and the must-
carry rules; they can also continue to benefit from a revenue stream under the 
Copyright Act.141  The government would also come out ahead here, since 
much of that freed up spectrum would be auctioned.  Mobile carriers and 
internet service providers are willing to pay the government top dollar for a 
slice of the radio frequency spectrum pie.142 
A Spectrum Reduction Plan may also be a net gain for MVPD 
carriers since they could benefit from freed-up spectrum.  Ultimately, there 
should be no additional burden for pay television providers.  The burden 
analysis under Turner’s application of the O’Brien test will be the same for 
pay television providers.143  Presumably, the same broadcasters who 
currently elect compulsory free carriage under the must-carry rules would 
continue to elect compulsory carriage.  It may even be less of a burden for 
pay television MVPDs since broadcasters’ reduced bandwidth would take up 
less space in the cable or satellite pipeline. 
Could broadcasters be happy with a mandatory Spectrum Reduction 
Plan?  Well, that remains to be seen.  At the end of the day, licensees would 
not lose much.  To the extent that de minimus spectrum allocation is 
incompatible with HDTV transmission, broadcasters can include that in 
enhanced signal negotiations—at market rates—with pay television 
providers.  The small percentage of homes that currently receive antenna 
signals would lose high-definition capability, but since licensees multiplex 
their signals into standard definition programming streams, they are not 
really losing high-resolution reception.144  Licensees may chafe with the 
continuation of the public interest regulations that attached to their use of 
spectrum—but industry challenges of scarcity and public trustee 
justifications for broadcast regulations are not new.145  Indeed, one of the 
benefits to the public of a Spectrum Reduction Plan is that it does not change 
the scarcity and fiduciary calculus.  The spectrum is still scarce, and it is still 
                                                 
139. See FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N SPECTRUM POLICY TASK FORCE, supra note 
6, at 20–21; Only Seven Percent of TV Households Rely on Over-the-Air Signals, According to 
CEA Study, supra note 4. 
140. See Evolution of Cable Television, FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, 
http://www.fcc.gov/encyclopedia/evolution-cable-television (last updated Mar. 14, 2012). 
141. 17 U.S.C. § 106; TBS, 520 U.S. at 185, 189–90. 
142. See FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, supra note 43, at 1, 2. 
143. See TBS, 520 U.S. at 185, 189–90. 
144. Lung, supra note 86, at 205–06; Only Seven Percent of TV Households 
Rely on Over-the-Air Signals, According to CEA Study, supra note 4. 
145. See FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, supra note 43, at 1–2; Lung, supra note 86, 
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administered by the government as a public trust.146  Licensees are simply 
using less of it.147 
In the wake of their victory in Aereo, incumbent broadcasters have 
no need to make good on threats to migrate to subscription-based MVPDs 
such as Netflix or Comcast.148  They enjoy the best of two monopolies: 
Command-and-control over spectrum, and the exclusive rights of the 
Copyright Act.149  But they do not need a generous spectrum allocation today 
to run a profitable business.  If the right balance is struck, broadcasters, pay 
television MVPDs, broadband companies, phone carriers, and the 
government could all benefit from a Spectrum Reduction Plan.  And, perhaps 
most importantly, the public would also benefit, since spectrum reduction to 
broadcasters means more spectrum is available for the public benefit 
elsewhere, and broadcasters would still need to operate in the “‘public 
interest, convenience, and necessity.’”150 
146. See FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, supra note 43, at 1–2. 
147. See id. 
148. See ABC, Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., No. 13-461, slip op. at 17–18 (U.S. June 25, 
2014); Sandoval, supra note 3. 
149. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012); FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N SPECTRUM POLICY
TASK FORCE, supra note 6, at 2–3. 
150. See Eisenach, supra note 42, at 7, 18. 
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